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•

FORMAL MODELS AND FORMALIST ECONOMIC
ANTHROPOLOGY: THE PROBLEM
OF MAXIMIZATION
Stuart Plattner

Harold Schneider's work has been an important force in the development of economic anthropology.

His hard-boiled insistence that we see

things for what they are, and not deny the economic qua 1i ty of exotic
behaviors merely because the analogous behavior in our own society is
not economic, places him in a valuable tradition in anthropology.

His

insistence that people generally act rationally in pursuit of their own
interests is a healthy antidote to any lingering intellectual miasma
caused by a belief in "culture-bound" natives practicing exotica.

Ce-

cause of this and more, we appreciate his work.
In his recent book Economic Man he gives a strong picture of
formalist economic anthropology. 1 Among other things, the book provides
a nice fifty-page summary of selected cor.cepts in microeconomics, some
of which are then used as a theory of social exchange to reanalyze
some well-known cases in the literature; it includes a good discussion
of the relevance of economic anthropology; and in it Schneider slings
a few more barbs at the substantivist camp. This list has not been
exhaustive, and this essay is not meant to be a complete review of the
book.

Here I will mainly react to what I think is the key issue in

his argument:

the use of maximization as a basic assumption for a

model of human behavior.
Schneider claims that he has the answer to our economic anthropological problems, and tells us that

1some of the ideas presented here were discussed at a seminar chaired
jointly by myself and John Bennett, at the Department of Anthropology,
Washington University, on April 17.
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anthropology can profit by opening its mind to [microeconomic] analytic methods, not only in economic anthropology
but more generally as well. Economic man i~ . . . in all
of us, he is a part of all of us, but he is an abstraction
from us and not the whole of any of us . . • (p. ix, square
bracket insert mine).
Yet methinks he doth protest too much, and demonstrate too little.
~Je all stand more or less in awe of the mathematical power of microeconomics--at least as a normative discipline.

But even economists,

and famous ones at that, admit that their models are brutally simplified pictures of empirical reality (e.g., Mansfield, 1970:15-16;
Samuelson, 1964:737). The empirical point of the game is to show how
the abstract model relates to the complex, noisy reality we must deal
with. There are precise rules about this, yet even Nobel prize-winning
economists use the word art when they talk about it (Samuelson,
11

11

1964:739). Thus we should adopt a Missourian "show-me" attitude
towards Schneider's claim that the microeconomic model is applicable
to all sorts of transactional behavior.

Especially since the claim

is not substantiated with empirical demonstrations in the strict sense,
where ethnographic data is actually used in a microeconomic model.
Most of the examples in Economic Man are actually ex post facto rationalistic sorts of analyses where microeconomic analogs are merely identified in ethnographic cases.
Microeconomic theory, insofar as it is a unified body of concepts
rather than a claim to a domain of research, is the normative study
of efficient production, exchange, and consumption in defined contexts.
The theory specifies the optimal combinations of inputs to some process
which creates an output valued along a single dimension, such as money
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or utility. Thus in producti~n the model shows how to combine various
factors (such as land, labor, capital) in order to efficiently produce
an output (e.g.~ corn).

In exchange or consumption the model delineates

the levels of different goods necessary to yield the optimal level of
profit or satisfaction.

Efficiency, here, refers to the largest quan-

tity of output per unit of input, or the smallest quantity of input
consistent with a given level of output.
Schneider claims that this model has universal applicability and
exhorts us to use it.

Now all theories, being phrased in general

terms, can be used for more than one case--oth~rwise they are trivial.
What is needed is the specification of the limits to the theory.

We

must know what it can interpret so that we have some idea of what it
cannot handle, since a theory that explains everything explains nothing.
What is sorely missed in the book is the explication of particular attributes which any empirical situation must have in order to satisfy
the basic assumptions of the microeconomic models. This would be a
significant service to economic anthropology.

Without it, we must

conclude that Schneider's urgings about microeconomics have not lifted
the formalist-substantivist controversy out of the non-empirical mire
it has floundered in since its inception.
My main intent here is to criticize the use, by other anthropologists as well as Schneider, of maximization as a basic assumption
in models of human behavior.

I have no quarrel with the use of max-

imization as a normative concept, but do have doubts about its
validity in descriptive models. The importance of this question
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increases as more and more formal models, based on microeconomics, are
used in anthropology. 2
Is what Schneider says about microeconomics valid?

Is the field

really based on the primal ·,,.assumption that "actors make decisions
11

11

aiming to maximize their utility . . . "? (p. 35)

Is it true that

The famous and much-maligned economic man is a greedy fellow,
seeking always to improve his position with respect to value
taken in some general sense (utility). Is this assumption
justified? Is it something peculiar to economics, a crutch
upon which it leans in contrast to the harder sciences, which
can do without it [sic] as they deal only with observable
and measurable reality?" (p. 35)
This is a complex question and deserves to be examined at length.
To begin, we must ask whether the assumption that people maximize as
a strategy is empiric.a lly justified, that is, whether it describes
observable behavior.

If it does not, we must ask whether it should,

or whether the model can do without it.

If it should then prove to

be dispensable, what concept should replace it? And lastly, given all
of that, what should we conclude if a microeconomic model is found to
apply to some II really" ethnographic data, what wi 11 that te 11 us about

2Here I must clarify a confusion in the book between a "formal" approach
to data analysis and the "formalist" approach to economic anthropology.
Schneider does not distinguish between the two, as for example in the
fon11al method only works if men are seen as entirely selffollowing:
oriented" (p. 21). Now, this cannot really be, since formal models (as
sets of deducations, from explicit assumptions, related to each other
in logically sound structures), are obviously applicable to all sorts
of reality. Formal models of exchange and production are constructed
without any mention of microeconomics--ecologists and psycnologists do
it all the time. The validity of the microeconomic formal model is
certainly a separate issue from the value of formality in theorizing. So
Schneider uses the wrong word, and says "formal" when he means "microeconomic.
11

11
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the real world from which the data was drawn?

I will discuss this last

question in light of a strange thing about this book.

Although Schneider

exhorts us in the strongest terms to use microeconomics wherever we can
in analyzing our data, he ignores the only published case that I know
of where a microeconomic model i s used to statistical ly anal yze ethnographic data. This is the article by Benton Massell, a mathemati cal
economist, published first in 1963 and republished by Schneider and
LeClair in 1968.

In the light of its complete absence from this new

book, it is astounding to note that the article consists of a production function analysis of Schneider's own Turu data, done by Massell
because he though that Schneider was trying to do verbally what could
be done econometrically (personal communi cation).
I must first note that microeconomic analysis always takes the
parameters of the economic environment as given, or exogenous to the
model. Thus the maximum efficiency situation for a particular firm
with set amounts of capital, labor, ability, and so forth is calculated
by the economic analyst, given the culturally set definitions of a
11

normal work day, rate or work, level of income, etc. This solution
11

is completely culture bound and situation specific.

When unions succeed

in lowering the work-week to 25 hours, or banks succeed in raising the
interest rate to 20%, then a new maximization point must be reached.
It does not matter that a model can only be used to predict i·f particular
values can be given for the parameters, since this is one of the attributes of a good empirical model.

But as cross-cultural observers

we are concerned with explaining how the parameters get set.

Is the
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society "maximizing its utility" in some sense by changing the definition
of a normal work week from 40 to 25 hours? Can the same be said about
the interest rate, or about international relations as they affect
trading patterns? If the claim is 11 yes, 11 then by what mechanisms does
this process work? The maximization position which microeconomic theory
describes is always purely local, and wholly dependent upon the workings
of the (exogenous) cultural system to provide the parameter values. The
analysis is usually normative, in the sense of showing how an observed
process deviates from some optimal state; rather than descriptive,
meaning that it shows how an observed process developed and functions.
ls -maximization a valid empirical hypothesis? That is, does it
describe behavior that we can observe in the real world?
think that it does.

Few economists

To quote from a recent work on the subject,

"There is probably unanimous agreement in the economics profession today that theoretical analyses of profit-maximizing
behavior are not to be taken as a literal account of the
processes by which firms make significant economic decisions
. • . Given the methodological consensus of decision processes,
it is not surprising that there exists nothing that could be
regarded as a coherent orthodox view of how firms actually
make decisions." (Winter, 1971:240)
In the context -of microeconomic theory, a maximizing decision
requires the decision maker to calculate and compare marginal values
(revenue, costs, products) which are extremely subtle ontological
entities. There is an ongoing field of research in psychology which
examines the relation between statistical inferences made by average
people, and the corresponding optimal inference as would be made by
a "statistical man" (Peterson and Beach, 1967). While it is premature
to summarize the results of a new area of research, I believe it can
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be said that statistical entities like the parameters of regression
equations are not nonnally well estimated by people.

Indeed, Herbert

Simon, one of the leading researchers in the area of behavioral decision making, long ago flatly claimed that the computational difficulties
involved in solving the maximization equations in a complex process
are beyond the abilities of human beings (1955).

No evidence has come

forward since then, that I know of, that would lead us to alter this
view.
Perhaps empirical realism (the quality of being observable in
the real world) is not , necessary for the ,maximization . concept to be
used as an . axiom of the theory.

After all, if the deducations drawn

from the maximizing axiom lead to empirically valid predictions, if
"individual firms behave~ if they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns" (Friedman, 1953:21), then what does it
matter if we happen to know that practically no one finn actually does
"seek rationally to maximize?" As Schneider says, the maximization
axiom allows us to "solve equations" and to predict things through
the 11 establishment of equilibrium pointsH (p. 35).

In fact Schneider,

fo 11 owing Friedman and Chomsky, goes even further and links the use
of 11 mystical 11 assumptions to the "great success" of advanced sciences
such as physics (pp. 35-37).
This sort of notion, that a theory may actually be superior for
the unreality of its assumptions, has been impishly labelled the
11

F-Twist 11 by Professor Samuelson in his superb critique of it (1963,

1964, and especially 1965).

Essentially he says that unreality in
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assumptions can be nothing but a weakness in any theory which aims to
explain reality.

Sometimes, in the development of a field, an unreal-

istic assumption may prove useful in allowing the construction of a
model which proves empirically valid in its predictions. This usefulness
should not blind the practitioner to the fact that ignorance is always
a sad fact and never a blissful state in science. The actual debate
that Samuelson's papers contribute to quickly left this rather obvious
point to focus on more difficult general questions of the relationship
between observable reality and the statements made

by

scientific

theorists. The papers in the debate contain an important and clear
statement of the issues and are worth examining.

(I benefited from

reading Massey, 1965; Nagel, 1963; Samuelson, _1963, 1964, 1965; and
Simon, 1963.)
If maximization is too unrealistic to be part of the general
microeconomic theory, what concepts can take its place? So far as I
can tell, there have been two main streams of discussion on this point,
concerning the theory of the firm.

One is based on a model of natural

selection, and the other on observational studies of natural decisionmaking.
The natural selection ·approach can be surrmarized as follows:

in

essence it does not matter what decision rule a firm uses so long as
it exists in a competitive environment.

For if and when a firm becomes

more efficient than its competitors, for any reason including chance,
it has a higher proba~ility of remaining in business than its less

efficient peers. Over time, a process of natural selection can insure
that the firms which remain in business are the more efficient ones.
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Analogs of the biological model of natural selection are corrmonly
found in social science and usually have face validity, due to the
logical power of the general model. The problems with specific models
usually concern the isolation of the behavioral analog to genetic inheritance.

Winter notes that a random decision rule is not appropriate

even logically, as the model must be applicable to finns over the long
run and randomness does not imply consistency over time.

If the finn's

behavior is not consistent, success today says nothing about success
tomorrow and thereafter, even in an unchanging environment.
decision rule that is somewhat stable most be postulated.

Thus a
In that

case, however, its implications for short-run predictions must be
accepted:

"The very continuity that makes evolutionary adjustment

possible in the long run may produce short-run responses to changed
conditions that are significantly maladaptive" (Winter, 1971:245).
This sort of notion is familiar to economic anthropologists acquainted
with the ecological explanations of over-production in primitive
societies, such as the yam mounds of the Trobriands. The excess production in the short run is seen as an adaptation to long run extreme
variations in productivity caused by environmental changes. The
strategy that produces huge rotting piles of yams at the end of most
harvest seasons also produces the "Liepig-ian" minimum necessary for
the survival of the group in seasons where nature does not act
normally.
Winter stipulates that decisions are governed over the long run
by routine applications of simple decision rules, which are only examined and changed when the nonnal functioning of the finn is upset.
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This is a kind of satisficing decision rule, as proposed by Simon in
11

11

his classic paper on "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice" (1955).
Here he argued that most actors seem to examine alternatives sequentially
'

and accept solutions to their problems that merely surpassed some
threshold, rather than examine all alternatives concurrently i n a
search for a unique maximizing solution.

Cyert and March use these

sorts of decision rules to develop a behavioral theory of the firm i n
their landmark book (1963).

One of the studies they describe is a

computer simulation of the pricing behavior of a department in a large
department store. The program was built upon satisficing rules, and
accounted for the observed pricing behavior to an extremely close
degree (in three sorts of tests the model predicted 88, 95, and 96
percent of the prices).

Thus Schneider should not tie his belief in

the fruitful yields economic anthropology will harvest by cultivating
the microeconomic orchard, to maximization.

Alternatives exist in the

literature which do not force us to deny one of the main strengths of
ethnography, our common-sense familiarity with the realities of everyday life.
What then, does it mean when a· microeconomic model is used to
analyze ethnographic data? A model "explains" data insofar as it
11

fits, meaning that its assumptions are relevant to the empirical
11

situation and that it statistically accounts for a significant proportion of the variance.
case:

Let us examine what to my mind is an excellent

Massell's production function analysis of Schneider's own Turu

data (both articles are conveniently reprinted in LeClair and Schneider,
1968). This is a good test because the analyst is a professional
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economist and so could be expected not to misinterpret microeconomic
theory.

We can focus on the main issue of the meaning of the analysis

and not be misled into quibbles about anthropological mis-translations
of economic concepts.
Schneider portrays the Turu men as economic actors interested in
gaining wealth, and able to act strategically in order to do so. Their
primary goal is capital in the form of livestock; however the stock is
easily and frequently exchanged for grain. Wives produce grain, and
apply manure in the process as the necessary fertilizer.

Thus the

system can be diagrammed as follows, where solid lines are physical
production causalities, and dashed lines denote exchanges {i.e., livestock physically create manure which physically contributes to create
grain; while livestock can be directly exchanged for grain as well}.

/

._ LAND

<, ,.- ),
/

LIVESTOCK

_,-r LABOR

'

~
~

/7

.....

....__

MANURE

------- - -

-

_ ,- .,,,, ,,,,,.

A Model of Turu Grain Production

GRAIN
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Massell describes this process by a production function relating
quantities of grain to a set of factors of production consisting of
fertilizer (a proxy for capital, or livestock), land, and women (a
proxy for labor).
11

Having measures of these variables for 29 homestead

fann-firms 11 in Schneider's data, r1assell fits the model to the data

statistically in two ways:

by the common Cobb-Douglas fonn of log-

arithmically transfonned variables, and by a simple linear fonn, both
estimated by multiple regression.

The Cobb-Douglas function yields

the following estimates:
ln{Q)

=

.673 + .523 ln(K) + .267 ln(N) + .330 ln(L)
(.158)
(.174)
(.321)

R = .785, F = 13.4

where ln denotes a natural logarithm, Q is grain, K is a fertilizer
index, N is labor, Lis land, and the numbers in parentheses under
the coefficients are the standard errors. The value of R is not very
high, but certainly not insignificant when it is remembered that
data based on individual observations usually has more scatter than
data based on aggregates. Massell notes that the coefficient for
capital is significantly greater than zero at the .01 level, while
the coefficients for labor and land are not significant at the .05
level.

He then goes on to observe some facts about the data.

First, the coefficients sum to one, which is evidence of constant
returns to scale. The scale condition for finns in equilibrium is
precisely unity, since then it does not pay to increase or decrease
scale. Massell does not explicitly infer from this that the Turu
homesteads are akin to competitive firms, but this is the reason that returns to scale have theoretical interest.
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He goes on to compute the marginal value products of the factors
of production (i.e., the monetary value of the physical marginal products),
and compares them to the monetary cost of the factors.
is at the heart of production analysis.

This comparison

It reveals the economic struc-

ture of the production function by comparing the yields of units of
capital spent on each factor.

Under conditions of perfect competition

firms wi 11 keep buying factors of production until a do 11 ar spent on
any factor yields the same revenue as a dollar spent on any other factor.
This is the equilibrium position, as otherwise the firm could make more
revenue by buying more of some, and less of other factors.
In this light it is noteworthy that a shilling spent on a cow
yields .155 shillings worth of grain, one spent on labor yields the
same ( . 150) and a shilling's worth of land yields almost two. shillings
(l.95) in return.

Massell concludes that

Given the institutional factors which help determine the
price ef land, it is quite understandable, in purely
economic terms, for a man not to want to sell land. Moreover the community has set the relative prices of cat'fie
and women in such a way as to reflect their relative
marginal contribution to grain output • • . . The question
arises, can the results of the regressions be accepted
as evidence of the economic rationality of the Turu?
. . • one might argue that the pricing of women relative
to cattle (and refusal to sell land at the institutional ly
fixed price} lends sapport (to [this] thesis. (P. 449-450
in LeClair and Schneider; italics, and square bracket
insert in place of the word his added by S.P.}
11

11

11

11

,

Finally, he notes that any rationality applies to the aggregate
11

11

and not necessarily to the individual farmsteads.

This is so because

each farm could increase profits by buying more of some and less of
other factors until

11

the relative marginal productivies equal the

relative factor prices" (ibid, p. 450}.
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The prices of factors of production in a competitive economy are
theoretically set by the working of supply and demand through the
market.

Massell implies, on the basis of his analysis, that an analogous

market for wives and cattle exists in Turuland.

Now, a market must

display certain characteristics, relati _ng to the flexibility with which
resources flow between opportunities, to be an efficient mechanism for
price-setting.

In particular, the things offered for exchange must be

homogeneous, so that a buyer can potentially buy anything from anyone,
not restricted by his personal relationship with the seller; the
participants should be similar in size or share of the market, so
that every participant's decision to buy or sell is independent of
any other decision; resources should be able to enter, leave, and
substitute for each other freely; and participants should have good
(or perfect) knowledge of offers to sell or buy and production possibilities.

Finally, participants should be motivated to economize,

in the "weak" sense of generally preferring more to less wealth.
The market for wives in Turuland is not perfect in the technical
sense.

In the competitive model, factors move into and out of

different productive enterprises in ·response to differences in profitability--but do Turu men do the same with grain production? Do they
obtain wives freely .from any sector of the economy? Obviously not.
By what process, then, have the Turu come to value wives in such an
"economizing" way?

In what sense has the microeconomic model of the

production function explained the reality of Turu_grain farming?
This is not the place to answer that question.

I hope that

Schneider will do so ·some day, for I think that the answer will be
I
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significant to us.

I want to cast doubt on the validity of Massell s
1

analysis, not because I know it to be mistaken, but because I think we
need an explicit discussion of the issues it raises.

Specifically the

fit between the assumptions of the model he uses and the empirical
situation he applies it to must be examined.

I do not raise these

questi·ons maliciously, but on the basis of some very signifi cant
research recently done by Hugh Gladwin (n.d.).
Gladwin s work is in the tradition of Simon's (op . cit) proposals
1

for alternative, mar~ behaviorally sensible, microeconomic decision
rules.

Gladwin demonstrates precisely how a conmonly used model of

decision making is invalid, even when it is successfully fitted to
11

a specific body of data.

The difference Gl adwin focuses on is between

hierarchical and trade-off rules.
11

11

11

In a hierarchical rule, especially

the 11 lexicographic 11 (cf. Quinn, 1971; Tversky, 1969) rule he uses, the
criteria at any level of a decision process have complete logical
priority over subsequent levels.

For example, in buying a house, no

buyer will purchase a house if it costs more than some amount, no
matter what its value on other important criteria such as location
and appearance. The trade-off m~del presupposes that the decisionmaker may .accept a house with a price over his preferred limit if it
is very high in location- or appearance value. Thus he trades off
negative values on some criteria for positive values on others, in
the process achieving a high level on some underlying criteria such
as

11

utility. 11

Regression models are based on trade off processes,

while hierarchical or tree models are not.
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Gladwin does what Simon, Cyert and March should ,have done:

he

constructs a model of decision-making that is hierarchical, produces
a body of data with it, and then analyzes this data with the (inappropriate) trade"off model.

He thus is investigating the power of our

analytic procedures to detect invalid models. The decision he studies
is house"buyi_ng, and he constructs a computer program to simulate the
process using a lexicographic rule.

The simulation program produces

"buyers" with various amounts of income and preferences with respe~t
to location and appearance; for each buyer a list of "houses" is
prepared which vary on the three dimensions of cost, location, and
appearance. Fach buyer searches the available houses for one which
satisfies his criteria; but all buyers use the same lexicographic
non-trade off decision rule.

In this way the program produces a sample

of buyer-house pairs, or purchased houses.
Gladwin then analyzes this data~ if he did not know the model
which caused it.

He uses the seemingly sensible notion that a house's

saleability is some function of its cost, appearance, and location
acting together, i.e., that buyers trade off one criterion for another.
This model, which we know to be inco-r rect, is statistically fitted to
the data with multiple regression.

If we did not know the model which

produced the data, we would be led to accept the trade off model as an
"explanation."

Knowing the truth (the value of creating your own data!)

we see that it is merely a curve fitted to the data.

This may be used

for correlation but it is in no sense an explanation.
In his conclusion Gladwin points out that the difference between
a true model and a false one may not show up until the basic structure
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of the empirical situation changes.

When some change occurs, the false

model will be incapable of dealing with it, while the valid one will be
productive of new analyses and understandings.
This may apply rather directly to Massell 's analysis of Turu grain
production, and potentially to any analysis of data which takes Schneider's
advice and uses the microeconomic model (and, of course, it applies to
any other model). The moral is simple: empirical analysis must consist
of more than curve-fitting if it is to explain the world. The models
used must have empirically sensible assumptions.
So as to be as clear as possible, let me state my conclusions:
I agree completely with Schneider about the importance of formal
analysis (E.l,.

~

definition), because anthropology must deal with data

if it is to explain the world we study, and formal methods are superior
to informal methods.

In addition, and just as with any sort of analysis,

the theory used must be relevan·t to the empirical reality it is proposed
to explain. Thus the researcher has the responsib ility of choosing the
most formal method of analysis that is appropriate to the problem, and
must also empirically justify the model as thoroughly as possible.
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